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Taking the Moral High Ground:  
Practices for Being Uncompromisingly Principled 
ABSTRACT 
We examine how participants in a moral conflict hold fast to their beliefs during a highly-
publicized moment in an ongoing social controversy. We apply discourse analysis to a video-
recorded confrontation between a same-sex couple seeking a marriage license, and a county 
clerk refusing to provide the license for religious reasons, which took place after the overturning 
of the Defense of Marriage Act in the U.S.A. (and had prohibited same-sex couples from 
marrying). We examine how pragmatics of account avoidance sequences and framing are 
deployed in interaction to accomplish “being morally principled.” This case illustrates how 
mediated public conversations around social changes provide participants opportunities to 
perform moralities and define the terms of debate in relation to cultural institutions. We reflect on 
how the consequence of this event is a form of debate in which participants speak past each 
other ritualistically, constructing worldviews as incompatible and problems as unresolvable. 
 
KEYWORDS: accounts; framing; conflict; public controversy; discourse analysis; grounded 
practical theory 
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1. Introduction 
Polarization is a significant concern in society and scholarship (e.g., Cho & Ha, 2012). 
From disagreements in ordinary conversation to challenges of institutional decision-making and 
threats to international cooperation, the problem of what makes people differentiate themselves 
from one another evades easy solutions. Everything from big data to political theory has 
attempted to understand how individuals, groups, nations find themselves--increasingly, even 
intractably--at odds, drawing on psychological and other explanations (e.g., Jackson, Thorsen & 
Wring, 2016; Tucker, et al., 2018).  
This paper examines how other social functions might make seemingly-pointless 
conflicts intelligible by analyzing the pragmatic accomplishment of uncompromising 
disagreement, focusing primarily on how this is done through accounts (especially account 
requests and account avoidance) and framing. Accounts involve an accusation or implication 
regarding untoward behavior (Buttny, 1993), while framing refers to how situations are defined 
(Goffman, 1974) implicitly or explicitly. In this analysis of a morally-contentious event, we argue 
that avoiding accounts allows participants to indirectly assert a view as morally unassailable 
and, by extension, beyond social accountability; while orienting to unshared framings redefines 
the terms of the argument to make cooperation more difficult. We apply discourse analysis from 
ethnomethodological and grounded practical theoretical perspectives to a recorded 
confrontation between a same-sex couple seeking a marriage license and a county clerk 
refusing to provide the license for religious reasons, which took place after the overturning of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in the USA (and had prohibited same-sex couples from 
marrying). In the following sections we review literature on moral conflict, then discuss the 
context of the case study and methodological approach. We thereafter present the results of our 
analysis, which explicates techniques participants use to enact moral identities in conflict. We 
end by reflecting on the implications of this analysis. 
2. Literature Review: Moral conflict 
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Our focus is on interaction within a moral debate or moral conflict. The former 
emphasizes its public, mediatized nature (Hutchby, 2005); the latter, its intractability and hostility 
(Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997).  Moral conflict is a kind of disagreement; in disagreements, 
participants take oppositional stances toward some person, situation, etc. Analyzing 
disagreement is analytically challenging. To maintain empirical rigor, one must neither advance 
an a priori definition, nor assume certain forms (such as negation) always function as 
disagreement (Angouri & Locher, 2012). An interactional approach focuses on the complexity of 
actual disagreements as they occur in context and are treated as disagreements by 
interlocutors (Haugh, 2007; Sifianou, 2012). Not all disagreements are necessarily moral. Thus, 
we do not describe this disagreement scenario as a moral conflict in a purely theoretical way or 
as an analytic term: the participants are “doing” moral conflict, and orienting to their conduct as 
such, through their turn-by-turn actions. By refusing to engage in the basic intersubjective 
expectations built into the fabric of ordinary conversation (Garfinkel, 1967)--and by avoiding 
providing normatively-demanded responses--the participants construct their interaction as an 
intractable conflict in which compromise is not possible.  
Moral conflict involves incommensurable interactional frames: incompatible definitions 
about and actions in accordance with the definition of a situation, nature of a problem, terms of 
an argument (Brockriede, 1975; Goffman, 1974). For instance, in an analysis of interethnic 
relations at convenience stores in Los Angeles during the 1990s, Bailey (2000) showed how 
differing cultural beliefs about service encounters, ways of enacting respect, and social 
differentiation produced ethnic conflict. Another example, analyzed by Agne and Tracy (2001) 
and Agne (2007), involved negotiations during a 50-day standoff between the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a religious group in Waco, Texas, that ended in a fire and the 
deaths of 80 men, women and children who were members of the group. Part of what led to this 
tragedy can be traced to how the problem of the conflict was defined and treated throughout the 
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negotiations: they ended up reinforcing the incompatibility of legal and religious frames, 
resulting in a devastating crosstalk (Agne, 2007). 
As Brockriede (1974) and Fitch (2003) point out, argument and persuasion require a 
minimal shared cultural frame of reference. Without some common ground, participants in a 
conflict are liable to talk past each other and never progress toward understanding, let alone 
shared courses of action. One can observe this empirically through a lack of intersubjectivity 
(Sidnell, 2014), escalating disalignment, disaffiliation, or disagreement (Drew & Walker, 2009), 
and divergent communication patterns (Bailey, 2000). It is not necessary to deal with such 
psychological matters as intention (Edwards & Potter, 2005) to realize that when participants 
engage in such practices and orient to conflicting frames, they accomplish intractable conflict 
(Brummans et al., 2008). This is likely to be the case in moral conflicts because morality is 
socially defined by being principled, and principles are often conceptualized as unmovable and 
invariant (Bergmann, 1998). To treat them otherwise has implications for people’s identities: 
once someone has taken a course of action, the seriousness of their choice is evaluated in part 
by whether they are easy to budge from that course. Framing and frame construals work in a 
similar way to present a particular view by authorizing or warranting one’s actions (van der 
Houwen, 2009).  
The hostile dimension of moral conflict resonates with a practice described by Tracy 
(2008) in which participants display “reasonably hostility” through emotion-limned talk that 
presents itself as righteous and warranted. In certain contexts, the sociolinguistics of aggression 
(Grimshaw, 1990) are considered appropriate (OMITTED). Participants may enact stances to 
present themselves as truly committed, evidenced through their displays of affect and 
willingness to engage in face-attack (Goffman, 1967). Though disagreements are “about” things, 
they are also “done” in ways that might be treated as face-threatening, dispreferred, or impolite 
(Georgakopoulou, 2012); this is not merely a feature of topics-in-interaction, but displays 
important connections to, and performances of, identities (Spencer-Oatey & Ruhi, 2007). How 
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much impoliteness is acceptable is contested, and attributions of impoliteness can also be 
strategies (Sorlin, 2017).  
We focus on accounts as a practice through which participants orient to different frames, 
invoke different authorities, and do intractable moral conflict. Accounts are explanations offered 
in the context of potentially problematic situations (Buttny, 1993): they are reasons where 
reasons are purportedly needed. Accounts make one’s actions intelligible. We focus on 
accounts demanded and offered or withheld in the course of interaction (see Boden, 1994; 
OMITTED). Our focus on account avoidance seeks to encompass various forms--e.g., refusing 
accounts, ignoring accounts, etc.--to emphasize that this is not solely accomplished by 
particular participants, but is constructed across their turns.  
By avoiding giving accounts that are demanded, participants propose such demands are 
unintelligible or inappropriate. Accounts can be rejected, as answers may be treated as 
uncooperative (e.g., Antaki & Stokoe, 2017)--so it is not just about what a participant says, but 
how this is taken up. We examine how features of interaction, such as dispreferred and 
disaligned actions, pronoun use, question delivery, orientation to authority, etc. (e.g., Gruber, 
2001; Heritage, 2002), are used in account sequences during a morally-conflicted interaction. 
Through such formulations, participants in a conflict attempt to frame one another’s views and 
conduct (van der Houwen, 2009). In the data we examine, interlocutors' avoid offering accounts, 
demand accounts in ways that presuppose no reasonable account can be forthcoming, and 
align themselves with frames that warrant their behavior as socially and morally righteous. 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Context 
We focus on an event characterized by morally-opposed views related to an ongoing 
controversy in the U.S.A. In June of 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court overturned DOMA, granting 
same-sex couples the right to marry under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. Several 
counties across three states in the Southern U.S. refused to comply. Kim Davis, a county clerk 
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in Kentucky, garnered national attention after David Ermold and David Moore released video-
recorded footage of her denying them a marriage license. Lawsuits were filed against her and 
she was briefly permitted to work during a stay of her appeal against the lawsuits. Our analysis 
examines the second interaction between Kim Davis, and David Ermold and David Moore, 
during which Davis had returned to work. Though the stay granted Davis was contingent on her 
complying with the issuance of licenses until a possible appeal, she continued to refuse granting 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.2 Ermold and Moore returned to repeat the process of 
procuring a license, but coming after the original video and subsequent media attention, it is a 
more crowded and public affair. In addition to Davis and her coworkers on one side of the 
counter,3 Ermold and Moore are flanked by other couples attempting to obtain licenses, media 
reporters, and members of the public. Thus, this second encounter provides an opportunity to 
capture, in action, how this encounter was worked up by participants as a public spectacle, with 
a purpose oriented as much to an imagined audience as to the local context (figure 1).  
                                               
2 Davis was charged with contempt of court and briefly jailed after this, during which her office began issuing 
marriage licenses as ordered; Davis ultimately returned to work but removed her name from and refused to authorize 
marriage licenses personally. 
3 In multi-party conflict such as this one, oppositional stances are often produced across the interaction and may be 
reinforced in various ways to ally certain participants with others (Kangasharju, 2002). In this case we see this being 
done in relation to the physical environment and the appropriate institutional roles played out within it, as the counter 
forms a barrier that is oriented to as the dividing line between ideological positions several times during the 
interaction.  
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Figure 1. The highly public spectacle of the second attempt to obtain marriage licenses.  
 
A video clip of approximately 5 minutes, available on USA Today’s YouTube channel1, 
was transcribed by organizers of the 2016 International Communication Association 
Preconference “How to Analyze Authority and Power in Interaction,” at which we presented 
preliminary findings4 (see Milburn, 2017 for more background and analysis).5 The transcription 
uses simplified Jefferson (1984) notations that capture aspects of the interaction beyond 
content, including overlaps, pauses, and volume; and we attend to nonverbal components. 
Though we analyze a single case, it is not simply that we take an instance and consider whether 
it might apply elsewhere: we are analyzing a particular instructive event for understanding the 
phenomenon we illustrate herein (see also Maynard & Manzo, 1993; Schegloff, 1987; Whalen, 
                                               
4 A forthcoming edited collection based on the pre-conference is in development that also analyzes this interaction 
with the goal of providing pedagogical guidance on how to analyze authority and power in interactions. 
5 Milburn’s (2017) analytic orientation is also discursive and ethnomethodological, but does not employ grounded 
practical theory; and her project also differs from this one in applying Membership Categorization Analysis. Milburn 
examines how the participants use membership categories to accomplish a local interpersonal conflict as part of a 
large social crisis. This event, as a social drama, shows how “natural” categories are challenged and redefined 
through transgressions; Milburn describes the outcome of this as an “irreparable schism” that maintains the conflict 
and projects it into the future.  
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Zimmerman & Whalen, 1988). The event itself is noteworthy and worth deconstructing, and is 
not merely as one instance from which to generalize. 
3.2 Methods of analysis 
We apply discourse analysis and features of conversation analysis (Cameron, 2001; 
Ehrlich & Romaniuk, 2014; Heritage, 2005; Tracy, 2001) to examine how accounts and frames 
are produced or avoided in turn-by-turn interaction and what social functions these actions 
serve in an event that occurred during a controversial political moment in U.S. history. We focus 
on language and its pragmatic use while considering how actions are sequentially and 
multimodally accomplished. Discourse analysis approach is informed partly by 
ethnomethodology--examining how participants render their actions intelligible (Garfinkel, 1967), 
especially in a situation where they seem determined not to do what they’re meant to be doing--
and primarily by grounded practical theory (GPT)6.  
GPT (Craig & Tracy, 1995) is a normative approach to communication that examines 
techniques people use to address problems, analysing these as strategies that (do or don’t) 
accomplish participants’ aims. Our empirical approach is similar to action implicative discourse 
analysis (Tracy, 1995) in that, drawing on GPT, it examines situated goals, and strategies 
participants use to accomplish them. We show how, within the actions of demanding and 
denying accounts and orienting to divergent frames, participants produce moral conflict and 
portray themselves as uncompromisingly principled.  
4. Analysis 
4.1 Holding fast by withholding accounts 
We examine sequences in which accounts are made relevant or explicitly demanded, 
but no account is forthcoming. While accounts may be used to manage conflicts (Sitkins & Bies, 
                                               
6 Craig (2003) has detailed some of the challenges in combining ethnomethodology’s (EM) epistemological position 
with normative analysis, and notes the usefulness of borrowing from EM for examining argumentation. While doing so 
may “violate” fundamental assumptions of EM according to Garfinkel’s articulation of it, the attempt nonetheless 
appears to be useful. 
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1993), in these data, participants use tactics to withhold accounts: they invoke certain frames 
and appeal to relevant authorities to suggest accounts are unnecessary, inapposite, or unfairly 
demanded. In doing so, participants reveal multiple and contradictory frames and sources of 
authority. These resistances are not merely in service of hashing out whether interactional, 
institutional, legal, business frames and authorities should take precedence: these strategies 
differentiate people’s positions and identities morally, and accomplish incompatible moralities in 
an intractable conflict. First we describe types of sequences in which accounts were expected 
but not provided, and how participants drew on frames and authorities to avoid providing 
accounts. Then we show how the participants’ explicit framing in metadiscourse constructs their 
interaction as an intractable moral conflict.  
4.1.1 Framing out authorities 
We examine how accounts and account denials “frame out” certain sources of authority 
by instantiating genres and embedding themselves into generic, recognizable scripts. The idiom 
“framing out” is apt because in Goffman’s (1974) conception of frame analysis, situations are 
built and roles organized within frames, and most of the time people work to be “in frame”; but in 
the same way that buildings are “framed out” by the literal process of construction, the account 
refusals we examine produce multiple interactional misalignments that diverge their framings 
outward rather than inward toward a common ground. From the moment Kim Davis enters the 
room, this process begins. 
Excerpt 1 “Being disrespectful” 
1 
2 
MOORE:  solutely ludicrous (0.5) don't smile at me 
(1.0) 
3 DAVIS: I did not smile (1.0) I'm not being disrespectful to you- 
4 ERMOLD: you absolutely have [disrespected] 
5 MOORE: [you absolutely] have been disrespectful to us 
6 
 
treating us as second class citizens is what you are doing 
7 DAVIS: [mm no no no] 
8 MOORE: [telling us that] we don't deserve the same right rights that you do that you 
have 
9 DAVIS: I'm saying that [you do] 
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Figure 2. Though the image is blurred, the shape of the shadow suggests an upturned mouth.  
 
10  MOORE:                         [that you’ve] enjoyed your entire life. (0.5)  
11 
 
would you do this to an interracial couple? 
 
Immediately, Moore charges Davis with an accountable action (line 1): by issuing a directive 
against an action usually interpreted as prosocial (smiling) (Hudak & Maynard, 2011), Moore 
suggests her behavior is inapposite. By doing so, he makes an account relevant. Davis begins 
by denying having smiled (line 3); the video is not clear enough when zoomed in, but her face 
may have the appearance of a smile (figure 2). 
 
 What is worth noting is how Davis repairs her denial of smiling to “I’m not being 
disrespectful to you” (line 3). In doing so, any actions she may have done are being claimed as 
“not disrespectful.” Smiling is considered a reasonable greeting in most interpersonal 
encounters, especially service encounters (Cameron, 2000). Though at this point we cannot 
confirm that Davis is operating within a service encounter frame, subsequent actions make the 
interpretation reasonable. After a pause, Kim’s negative response (“a man and a woman, no”), 
and another pause (lines 12-14, omitted for space), Davis again avoids an account by invoking 
a customer service frame: 
Excerpt 2 “Not issuing marriage licenses” 
15 MOORE: how many times have you been married Kim? 
16 DAVIS: I just want to let you know that we are not issuing marriage licenses 
[today]= 
17 OTHER: [Why?] 
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18 DAVIS: =pending [um] 
19 OTHER:    [((yelling)) in] contempt to court= 
20 MOORE: =what appeal is left? 
21 DAVIS: <pending> the appeal [that of the Sixth Circuit] 
22 MOORE:                                     [it has been denied] 
23 
24 
25 
DAVIS: 
MORE: 
DAVIS: 
the appeal to [stay has been denied]=  
                      [(                                )] 
[=so] 
26 MOORE: [right] the induction is the order is that you 
27 
 
are supposed to issue marriage licenses 
28 DAVIS: and we are not issuing marriage [licenses today] 
29 MOORE:                                                     [the Supreme] Court denied your stay. 
30 DAVIS: we are not issuing marriage licenses today sir= 
31 MOORE: =based on what? 
32 DAVIS: I would ask you all to-  
33 MOORE: why are you not issuing [marriage=]  
34 
35 
36 
DAVIS: 
MOORE: 
DAVIS: 
                                       [go ahead-]  
=licenses today? 
because I'm not 
  
Moore once again asks Davis to account by asking in line 15 “How many times have you been 
married?” Though it’s not a literal challenge requesting a number per se, it is meant to highlight 
an apparent hypocrisy between Davis’s actions and her personal life. As with the example 
“would you do this to an interracial couple” in excerpt 1, it functions to do enticing (Reynolds, 
2011) by using a seemingly-innocent question to challenge the other. Davis offers a non-type-
conforming response (line 16, “I just want to let you know that we are not issuing marriage 
licenses today”) apparently appealing to the local organizational context by invoking a style 
reminiscent of a customer service genre. She uses “we” in an institutional sense and formulates 
a denial of service as a statement of fact, in the same way any business might say “we are not 
doing such-and-such today.” Institutions have rules that are presented as not negotiable; 
repeating such facts, as Davis does (lines 28-30), is a way of resisting customers’ attempts to 
negotiate non-negotiables, positioning the other as problematic.  
This positioning may give service workers grounds for removing customers (as evident 
in posted signs such as “we reserve the right to refuse service”); this, too, is invoked in Davis’s 
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denial of service beginning in line 16 (and reincorporated throughout the rest of the interaction). 
First, she invokes language that is reminiscent of an institutional script. Davis’s use of “we” 
unites her voice with that of the organization. To avoid giving an account, Davis invokes a 
customer service frame within which her greeting is considered polite, and her refusal to issue 
licenses is a simple denial of service which she has the “right to refuse.” She aligns her authority 
with that of an institution that is service-oriented and located primarily within the organizational 
space of that county office and the workers and ordinary tasks within it.  
Moore and those in alignment with him challenge this by issuing their demands for 
accounts and by framing her actions as problematic. To return to excerpt 1, Moore and Ermold 
are not merely disagreeing about whether she was respectful or not, but provide a different 
grounds on which to understand what “respect” means. In lines 5-6 and 8, Moore and Ermold 
reframe disrespect as a form of discrimination. This too is an institutional frame, as 
discrimination has legal connotations, and this understanding of its meaning is bolstered by 
excerpt 2 in which Moore and others explicitly move to a legal frame.  
Moore and others shift the institutional frame from a single service encounter, to an 
ongoing legal encounter that is not just built into the history of these people’s prior interactions 
(notice Moore uses Davis’s forename name in line 15) (see Sifianou, 2013 on relational history 
and conflict), but into the history of discrimination and its legal relation to marriage (as when 
Moore refers to interracial marriage in line 9). No one explicitly targets Davis’s job at this point 
as a basis for the wrongness of her denials: rather they bring up the legally-mandated necessity 
for her to provide licenses (lines 19, 22, 26-27, 29). This is in contradiction to Davis, who draws 
on the legal context as a basis for her denials, citing her appeal in lines 21 and 23. Even as both 
parties seem to be drawing on an institutional context, they are drawing on different institutions; 
and even after they both seem to be drawing on the legal institutional context to account for 
their actions, their talk actually indexes different components of the legal process. They 
therefore come to differentiated conclusions about whether Davis’s refusals are institutionally 
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right. Differing institutional contexts are “made to matter” (see Cooren, 2015), thus constituting 
the grounds of accountability in divergent ways.  
That Moore refuses to accept Davis’s account is evident in lines 33 and 35, in which he 
makes explicit his own demand (and recycles the account-seeking made by someone else 
present in line 14, not shown): “why are you not issuing marriage licenses today?” This turn 
effectively erases the previous sequence, rejecting Davis’s legal accounts and demanding 
another. In response, Davis once again does not provide an account (line 36). The intonational 
shift between “because” and “I’m not” projects that this could have been a point of possible 
completion, an instance of self-repair, or a shift in emphasis (or some combination thereof): this 
could indicate that “I’m not” is a revision of “we are not”, marking a transition between Davis 
speaking as an institution and speaking as herself; it could mean that Davis merely wanted to 
more clearly articulate that this is a personal choice embedded within an institutional action. It 
does not necessarily project that an actual account is forthcoming; “because I am” or “because I 
am not” is an authoritative move (Edmundson, 2013) and one formulaic practice by which 
participants can provide a response-like second pair part without providing a response 
(Maynard & Peräkylä, 2006). This is a way of doing authority that requires no account. That this 
is resistant is evidenced in excerpt 3 by Moore’s continued pursuit at line 37, and in close 
overlap with this, Ermold asks for a specific institutional reason “under whose authority” (line 
38), rejecting Davis as the basis of authority. 
Excerpt 3 “God’s authority” 
37 MOORE: wh[y] 
38 
39 
ERMOLD: 
OTHER 
[un]der whose authority? (0.5) [are you not issuing] licen[ses?] 
                                                [(                            )] 
40 DAVIS:                                                                                                [under] 
41  God’s authority 
42 OTHER: [God’s authority] ((behind the counter)) 
43 OTHER: [did lawyers tell you (   )] 
44 MOORE: [I don't believe in God] 
45 DAVIS: [(                               )] 
46 MOORE: [did God tell you how to treat us (.) like this?] 
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Figure 3. Davis’s expression as she comes to the completion of her turn at lines 40-41. 
 
47 ERMOLD: [I don't believe in your God.] I don't believe in your God= 
48 DAVIS: =I've asked you all to leave (.) you are interrupting [my business 
49 MOORE:      [you can call the police= 
50 OTHER: [t’s not your business] 
51 MOORE: [=if you want us to] leave (1.0) you can call the police I’m paying you your 
52  salary (.) I pay your salary 
 
It is at this point that Davis presents her personal, belief-driven grounds for refusing to 
issue licenses, invoking an ideological and moral frame that is simultaneously broader (beyond 
the institution) and more specific (within herself). In lines 40-41 she formulates her response, in 
a type-conforming fashion, to match the request for an “authority” by saying “under God’s 
authority.” The turn is accompanied by Davis lowering her eyebrows and pushing her head 
forward on her neck, which may display resolve or of dramatically indicate a point (note also that 
she sustains this pose through the subsequent five lines of talk).  
 
This appeal to authority is rejected by others present (lines 43, 47), and Davis thereafter 
reverts to appealing to the institutional context by once again framing herself as a besieged 
employee dealing with rowdy customers, reminding those present that she wants them to leave 
and formulating their talk as an interruption of her business (line 48). The formulation “my 
business” is ambiguous. It could be referring to Davis’s position, the office generally, or the 
organization they represent; or it could be referring to tasks she has to complete that day. “You 
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all” may suggest a shift to the general public (all the people present), away from the personal 
conflict she has with Moore and Ermold (though she maintains eye contact with Moore). The 
response “it’s not your business” in line 50 treats Davis’s prior turn as claiming some ownership 
of the office, implicitly highlighting the disconnect between Davis’s invocation of the institution in 
her talk, and her personal reasons for not doing her job. 
There is a mismatch between what frames each party’s language is indexing (c.f., Tracy, 
1997). Moore and the others frame the institution as a site where certain work must get done, 
beholden to legal and governmental demands, but also as a moment in a history of 
discrimination. Davis locates the institution in the physical organizational space she occupies, in 
relation to her own sets of tasks, and therefore beholden to her personal choices about 
completing them. Such choices are revealed to emerge from her individual religious beliefs, 
superseding institutional requirements. The next two excerpts show how the conversation 
evolves in ways that emphasize the differentiated frames and trajectories of talk already 
established. 
Excerpt 4 “Do your job” 
53 OTHER: we pay your salary 
54 MOORE: I pay you to discriminate against me right now ((banging hand against the 
55  counter)) that's what I'm paying for >that's what I'm paying for< I'm paying for 
56  this memory with my partner that I love that I’ve been with for seventeen 
57  years=what's the longest you've been with someone that you've been married 
58  to someone 
59 OTHER: ((laughs)) 
60 DAVIS: I'm asking you to le:ave, 
61 MOORE: I'm not leaving. 
62 
63 
DAVIS: 
MOORE: 
↑okay you all [can just push back away] 
                      [I’m not leaving] 
64 ERMOLD: [I'm asking you to do your job] 
65 DAVIS [you are all welcome to] stay 
66 MOORE: [I'm not leaving] 
67 DAVIS: [just push back away from the counter] 
68 MOORE: [can't help with the press here] (.) no 
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Figure 4. Davis makes this gesture as she produces the request at line 62. 
 
69 ERMOLD: no= 
70 DAVIS: =just push back [away from the counter] 
71 ERMOLD:                           [No, we're not leaving] until we have a license (.) we're not 
72  leav[ing until we have a license] 
73 DAVIS:        [then you're gonna have a] long day 
74 OTHER: DO YOUR JOB 
75 MOORE: (      ) call the police 
76 DAVIS: good day ((leaves)) 
 
As with excerpt 3, excerpt 4 continues a customer service frame, this time mobilized by Moore 
and his supporters through an account sequence in which descriptions of “we pay your salary,” 
“I pay you,” and “what I’m paying for” call Davis to account for the fact that she is not doing a job 
for which she has been paid (lines 53-55, 64, 74). Rather than being of the same customer 
frame within which Davis is attempting to deny service, Moore and others use a frame 
associated with public service (Tracy, 1997). Because public sector jobs are provided by the 
state and may be funded in part by taxpayers’ dollars, there is a slightly more literal relationship 
between the service nature of Davis’s job and customers’ rights to be served. Davis, however, 
continues to operate in a “right to refuse” customer service frame, continuing to ask them to 
leave, requesting they “push back away” in lines 62 and 67 (because of the crowd, and Moore 
being at the front, he cannot merely turn around and walk out) (figure 4).  
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Though Davis suggests as in the previous excerpt that “all” are interrupting her business or 
should leave (line 62), in line 65 she seems to partition at least some part of the crowd, 
positioning them as potential “reasonable” customers, and again framing the dispute as 
centered between herself, and Moore and Ermold. In response to the ultimatum that Ermold 
issues in lines 71-73, Davis offers a somewhat ironic prediction, once again refusing to concede 
her ground--but also potentially orienting to the fruitlessness of the situation.  
In the next excerpt, the theme of calling the police (mentioned in excerpts 3 and 4), is 
taken up more forcefully after Davis has returned to her personal office. 
Excerpt 5 “Call the police” 
77 MOORE: I will ask them to arrest you 
78 OTHER: DO (.) YOUR (.) JOB 
79 MOORE: CALL THE POLICE (.) [CALL THE POLICE GO AHEAD (   ) arrest you] 
80                                       [((applause, shouting)) 
81 OTHER: ((chanting)) do your job (.) [do your job (.) do your job]  
82 
83 
MOORE:                                            [YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF YOURSELF] 
EVERYONE IN THIS OFFICE SHOULD be ashamed of themselves (0.5) 
84  IS THIS WHAT YOU WANT TO REMEMBER? (1.0) IS THIS WHAT YOU  
85  WANT TO REMEMBER? (1.0) THAT YOU STOOD UP FOR THIS? 
86 
87 
88 
 
OTHER: 
MOORE: 
(1.0) 
aymen (.) yes sir ((behind the counter)) 
THAT YOUR CHILDREN WILL HAVE TO LOOK AT YOU 
89  AND REALIZE THAT YOU ARE A BIGOTS AND YOU 
90  DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PEOPLE? is that what you want af- 
91  is that what you want? 
92 OTHER: ((behind the counter)) God's word (  ) [(  )] 
93 ERMOLD:                                                             [God] does not belong in the county  
94  clerk’s office 
95 
96 
OTHERS: 
OTHER: 
[((shouting)) 
THIS IS NOT A HOUSE OF GOD 
97 MOORE: call them call the police (.) call them now. ((hits hand on the counter)) 
98  SOMEBODY CALL THEM 
99 ERMOLD: call them 
 
Moore delivers a commissive in line 77, and recycles the command “call the police” twice as a 
challenge in line 79, accompanied by pointing (figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Moore points at Davis as she is entering her personal office while producing the talk at line 79. 
 
 
 
 
The applause (line 80) ratifies this as something toward which the interaction has been leading 
the whole time: the completion of a ritual in which neither side expected to prevail, and in which 
that was perhaps never the point. 
Davis exits, and Moore’s raised voice and gestures suggest he is addressing himself to 
her in addition to the audience around him. He continues to speak loudly but now includes 
others more explicitly, moving from “you” in line 82 (which could be taken as singular, referring 
to Davis) to “everyone in this office,” after which subsequent references to “you” seem to 
encompass those in the office who may support Davis’s position (lines 84-85) (c.f., Fetzer & 
Bull, 2008). In this turn Moore again frames the interaction as discrimination and makes explicit 
that the activity is associated with a category of people, “bigots” (line 89), members of which are 
identifiable by their discriminatory activities. Religious invocations and references to God are 
produced again (lines 87, 92), countered by Ermold (lines 93-94). This utterance acknowledges 
the reference to God, but while before the account was rejected on the basis of differing beliefs 
(Moore and another say “I don’t believe in God” in excerpt 3), here it is directly framed as 
incompatible with the organizational context of the “county clerk’s office.” Moore and Ermold 
continue to ask that the police be called, and these appeals to the police further cement the 
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interaction as intractable and beyond resolution (lines 97-99). Because all parties seem to be 
orienting to this below-surface interactional goal of performing morality for an audience, their 
conflict is in part jointly accomplished--but since the accomplishment is about divergence, their 
actions must consistently refuse to comply with the most obvious institutional goals of the 
occasion. 
We described several examples in which accounts were made impossible, either 
because they were demanded in ways that refuted their validity from the outset, or because they 
were withheld. Within these account avoidance activities, scripts and authorities were invoked to 
frame the interaction in incompatible ways. These divergent framings reproduced complex and 
incompatible differences in expectations between the local organization (the office of the county 
clerk), and institutions such as law, marriage, and religion. Next, we examine account avoidance 
sequences that invoke the frame of the conversation itself. 
4.1.2 Taking the moral high ground in metadiscourse 
The phrase “taking the high ground,” almost by definition, means not taking the 
“common ground.” The implication is that to share the same ground is beneath one’s principles. 
As Billig (1989) notes, “strong views” are constructed in response to opposing views, and are 
rhetorically not just about the topic at hand, but about arguing about that topic. At certain points 
in this interaction, participants’ accounting tactics take place within a “righteous” metadiscourse 
that explicitly (re)frames what one another is doing, what it means, and what moral issues are at 
stake. Bateson (1955) describes metacommunication as a practice in therapy that can shift a 
conversation beyond seemingly paradoxical frames. In this view, metacommunication could 
have moved the conversation toward a more “genuine dialogue” (Buber, 2007). However, 
metadiscourse is also used to assert particular directions in talk or to critique higher-order terms 
of an argument or the person delivering it (as when disputing interlocutors accuse each other of 
“going too far”--see Kampf & Daksal, 2013; OMITTED). Here, metadiscourse functions even 
more decisively to preclude understanding.  
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Excerpt 6 “Listen” “Beyond Listening” 
100 DAVIS: listen= 
101 MOORE: =I'm beyond listening to you 
102 DAVIS: [(                                )] 
103 MOORE: [THIS IS RIDICULOUS] 
104 DAVIS: Please I’m not- [just listen to me=] 
105 OTHER:                          [DO YOUR JOB] 
106 DAVIS: =just listen to me [(   )] 
107 MOORE:                            [I don't-] I don't care how polite you are 
108 OTHER: WE’VE HEARD YOU= 
109 MOORE: =or what you fe:el= 
110 DAVIS: =I know you don't care 
111 MOORE: you're not- this is not poli:te 
112 DAVIS: this is- this is what [(                                                 )] 
113 MOORE:                              [I would never do this to someone]  
114  what you are doing to us I would never do to someone= 
115 DAVIS: =do you believe passionately [in what you are doing as I do okay] 
116 MOORE:                                                 [you do not understand what you are doing] 
117  to people= 
118 DAVIS: =as I do= 
119 OTHER: =but you’re forcing religion on other people 
 
Here Davis’s attempt to initiate a new kind of sequence is firmly rejected (lines 100-101). Her 
“listen” is a directive, and ambiguous: it could be a move to de-escalate or make herself 
understood, to reach some form of common ground; or it could be a further attempt to persuade 
Moore and others to leave. That Moore rejects this indicates he does not believe Davis’s 
attempts to engage him are genuine; or it could be a way of performing frustration. By 
formulating his turn as “I’m beyond listening to you” and defining the interaction as “ridiculous” 
(lines 101, 103) he positions Davis as someone who has done too much damage. This was 
already clear throughout the interaction, but is solidified here: the use of metadiscourse, framing 
the conversation itself, is a way of attempting to regulate another’s conduct (Craig, 1996). 
Moore even displays acknowledgement of her use of politeness styles (line 107), but rejects this 
as a basis for engagement. This is in parallel with the sequence first described, in which Davis’s 
TAKING THE MORAL HIGH GROUND 21 
possible politeness or verbal shows of respect are treated as too superficial given the impolite 
and disrespectful nature of her discriminatory actions. Politeness is expected of a customer 
service dimension, but the larger context has been reframed as combative. 
In his continuation of the turn (lines 107, 109), Moore describes Davis’s “listen” as 
indexing Davis’s “feeling.” This suggests that he is interpreting her requests that he “listen” as a 
bid to speak more about her personal viewpoints, projecting that he takes these to be 
inappropriate, unreasonable, or perhaps “too little, too late”; furthermore, by thematizing her turn 
as personal and psychological (Edwards & Potter, 2005), he may also be proposing that these 
matters are inappropriate to the organizational context, where opinions and other personal 
matters are presumed to be set aside. Davis’s “I know you don’t care” (line 110) positions Moore 
as unwilling to listen. Moore begins by saying “you’re not,” then repairs this to “this is not polite” 
(line 111), again displaying that Davis’s apparent tone may be polite in some sense, but her 
actions are not. He elaborates on this with an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986): “I 
would never do this,” repeated twice, which reinforces Davis’s actions as immoral and wrong. 
Davis then makes what appears to be a bid for a chance to account for her behavior. 
In line 115, Davis initiates a new sequence with an interrogative “do you believe,” 
framing what comes as a discussion of beliefs. Davis may be attempting a genuine discussion, 
but she may instead be merely seeking an opportunity to publicly formulate her beliefs for the 
audience around her (and those who will see the video later). Her attempt is not treated as a 
good-faith effort, and the prior interaction, as well as the forthcoming basis of Davis’s beliefs, 
suggest that this may not be an invitation to “discuss” at all. This is also suggested by the fact 
that she acknowledges but does not address Moore’s interruption in lines 116-117, nor does 
she respond to the accusation that she is “forcing religion on other people” (line 119), though 
this could be because the interaction is interrupted briefly for a side-sequence between Moore 
and the crowd behind him (lines omitted). 
Excerpt 7 “Beliefs cannot be separated” “Force your religion” 
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126 MOORE: you guys come up here too (.) come up here (.) tell them (.) tell them- tell 
127  them to their face. 
128 DAVIS: I don’t (    ) 
129 BEIGE:      she's already denied it a couple times with us, so  
130 OTHER:      this is your job mam that's all we are asking (.) do your job- but you have  
131  another option, you can step down 
132  (1.0)  
133   OTHER: If your beliefs mean that much to you? resi:gn (0.5) but does 80,000$ a year 
134  mean more to you than your beliefs. 
135  (1.0) 
136 DAVIS: no my beliefs cannot be separated from me= 
137 BEIGE: [then you should quit] 
138 DAVIS: [=I cannot take] my hat off in my [(in my own)] 
139 BEIGE:  [then you should quit] 
140 DAVIS: (        ) 
141 BEIGE: so you’re gonna force your religion on us? 
142 ERMOLD: why? are- are- are- you saying  [that our lives]= 
143 MOORE:  [I would quit] 
144 ERMOLD: =are worth your  [80,000$ a year? 
145 DAVIS: [I'm not saying your lives are [not worth (    ) I don't (      )] 
146 OTHERS:                                               [you are] [yes you are] 
147    DAVIS: you are putting words in my mouth and that will not do. I simply told you all- 
148      I'm willing to face my consequences and you all will face your  
149  consequences when it comes time for judgment 
150 MOORE: we don't have [consequences] 
151 DAVIS:                        [it's plain and s]imple= 
152 MOORE: =not everyone [believes] 
153 BEIGE:                        [not everyone] believes what you [believe] 
154 
155 
DAVIS:                                                                             [that's your] choice   
[that's your choice] 
156 MOORE:     [you're creating a re]ligion in this office= 
157 DAVIS: [↑no I'm not] 
158 MOORE: [=(   )       =] 
159 BEIGE: =yes you are [you are making yourself a figurehead of this new church here]= 
160 DAVIS:                       [(                                                                                               )] 
161 MOORE: =this is not the 1960's= 
162 DAVIS: =it's-= 
163 MOORE: =this is not- 
164 DAVIS: [Jesus is the same yesterday today and forever] 
 
In excerpts 7 and 8, Davis more clearly attempts to reframe the conversation ideologically. In 
some ways, this is consistent with the historical discrimination frame advanced by Moore and 
others, but takes up the matter from an entirely different perspective. Kant (and Berlin, 2002) 
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distinguishes positive liberty, or “freedom to,” from negative liberty, “freedom from.” Davis’s 
invocation of her religious beliefs to account for her (lack of) institutional action is an example of 
“freedom to,” in this case freedom to believe in a religion. Implicitly, this framing suggests that 
the legal and institutional demands being made of her can be seen as an example of “freedom 
from,” an imposition on her belief system. On the other side, Moore and others invoke “freedom 
from” Davis’s beliefs which are affecting their ability to complete an institutional hurdle. Implicitly, 
this framing links up with their “freedom to” marry. This logic is visible in Moore’s and others’ 
repeated references to Davis forcing her religion on them (lines 141,153, 156). 
Though Davis rejects the assertion that she is “creating a religion in this office” (line 156) 
in line 157, her later rejection that she is behaving in an “outdated way” (line 161) uses her 
belief in Jesus to account for the rejection: if Jesus “is the same yesterday, today and forever” 
(line 1647), then social changes and institutional rules are irrelevant to whatever a reference to 
“Jesus” is meant to index here. It seems likely that referring to Jesus is a kind of icon meant to 
stand for Davis’s religious beliefs in general, rather than indexing a particular teaching of Jesus 
that makes relevant her refusal to issue licenses.8 This ambiguity is noted in Moore’s next 
turn in which he begins by challenging Davis, but ends by dismissing her beliefs as irrelevant 
(excerpt 8). 
Excerpt 8 “The right to your beliefs” “The right to take away our rights” 
165 MOORE: I don’t- do you even know our religious beliefs are? you know why? you 
166  don't need to know we don't need to [know yours] 
167 DAVIS:                                                           [that's okay] okay= 
168 MOORE: =you can [have whatever beliefs you want] 
169 DAVIS:  [that's okay that's] [your choice] 
170 
171 
MOORE:                                              [I believe] you should have the right to have 
whatever beliefs you want= 
172 DAVIS: =that's- exactly exactly= 
173 MOORE: =you have the right to your [beliefs] 
                                               
7 This line occurs in overlap with unintelligible bystander talk in 164, which has been omitted for space. 
8  Nowhere in Jesus’ teachings does he reference same-sex relationships, although he refers to God creating “man 
and woman” in a way that suggests a special sort of relationship in Matthew 19:4 and 10:6. 
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174 DAVIS: [exactly] so if what [you all are trying to accomplish= 
175 MOORE: [you don't have the right to take away our rights based on 
176  =your beliefs= 
177 DAVIS: =is to get a marriage license [you can go anywhere in the surrounding areas 
178 
179 
MOORE:                                                   [we are trying to get a marriage license and we 
are going to stay until you give it to us 
 
An illustrative moment in this encounter occurs in lines 165-174: we see ostensible agreement, 
with repetitions of “that’s okay” and “exactly.” When Davis initiates with “what you all are trying 
to accomplish” (line 174), she asks Moore and the others to account for the fact that they are in 
fact not acting in ways that would result in obtaining a marriage license. Moore accedes this, not 
by providing an account as such but by making it clear that he is acting in this situation “on 
principle”: that he will not leave until he has made the point (lines 178-179), and that he will sue 
her if he has to (lines omitted). Moore’s point, in a sense, is stated in lines 175-176: “you don’t 
have the right to take away our rights based on your beliefs.” Though there is an underlying 
orientation to rights and freedoms as relevant to this conversation, this ideological and legal 
frame invokes again a difference between the parties in understanding what constitutes rights 
and freedoms, and where the balance tips when freedoms are enabling or protective. Because 
these rights and freedoms are in tension, it is difficult to accomplish one without threatening the 
other--hence so many intractable political debates. The scripts deployed here, which echo 
Western patterns of “personal belief” and “individual freedom,” authorize the same ideals (and 
imply their documents, such as the Bill of Rights and the Constitution) to accomplish different 
goals.  
In these data, participants jointly produced “at odds” talk that exploited the diversity of 
frames by invoking conflicting institutional and ideological frames to warrant the others’ 
accountability and one’s own unaccountability for the current conflict. By using familiar scripts, 
and appealing to and identifying with certain authorities, participants strengthened the system of 
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legitimacy and rightness from which they spoke, performing moral rightness to accomplish a 
fraught organizational situation.  
5.  The consequences of taking a stand 
When people take a stand, they become committed to it. This can pose a dilemma for 
participants when their positions are opposed, especially in complex institutional settings where 
contradictory political and moral ideologies are at play. In this case there are two, intersecting 
dilemmas. On one hand, there is the dilemma of upholding one’s individual beliefs versus 
upholding institutional requirements. If one is seen to waver, it could suggest one is not as 
committed to their beliefs. Moreover, there is a dilemma of authority--does one uphold the 
authority of God (as interpreted through individual beliefs), or does one uphold institutional 
authority? The analysis demonstrates one way to navigate these dilemmas through the 
communication practice of account avoidance.   
Our analysis showed how participants jointly avoid accounts by withholding or 
demanding accounts that cannot reasonably be provided, based on divergent framings of the 
situation locally and ideologically. In other words, they work together to deny accounts as 
possible based on their different views and aims. As Schiffrin (1990) notes, conflict can be as 
collaborative as it is competitive. If there’s one thing on which the parties of this interaction are 
aligned on, it’s that no one is going to change anyone’s mind, and no one is really trying: the 
interaction is a performance, a ritual. They cooperate by not cooperating, because that is the 
language game they are playing. Though on the surface we might say their conflict strategies 
were unsuccessful, it’s a different story if the conflict was never meant to be resolved anyway. 
The ritual resolves the dilemma and gives it moral meaning, if not institutionally practical effects.  
At the beginning of this paper, we posed the following questions: What actually happens 
when people are in the midst of unyielding disagreement? How do people accomplish 
intractability in interaction, and what might this tell us about the social and practical achievement 
and function of seemingly-incompatible positions in conflict? We examined how participants in a 
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moral conflict appear to hold fast to their beliefs: by withholding accounts when accounts would 
be expected (or are explicitly demanded), demanding accounts that presuppose no reasonable 
account can be provided, and orienting to divergent framing through these account practices 
and metadiscursive comments. From a grounded practical theory perspective, this is a 
technique that participants seem to employ here (but it is available to, and quite visible, in many 
other kinds of conflicts) that functions to pragmatically accomplish moral firmness and 
incompatible ideological positions. This points out some of the ways in which participants orient 
to one another’s positions as incommensurable, and (re)create their engagement as an 
intractable conflict. By framing another’s views as unreasonable, participants show their 
commitment to their own principles, and producing their talk through different organizational and 
institutional frames allows them to operate within a variety of flexible logics.  Different 
institutional frames were adapted to the demands of the interactional moment, rather than 
working to portray a consistent position across the interaction. These differentiated orientations 
also worked to produce disagreement rather than to seek common ground. In other words, the 
participants worked up their interaction as a sort of crosstalk--not developed out of 
misunderstanding, but out of conflicted positions.  
 Our analysis has contributed to empirical descriptions of disagreement in moral conflict, 
including some of the ways this can be pragmatically accomplished; furthermore, we showed 
how account avoidance and divergent framing are key ways of differentiating moral positions 
and producing those positions as insurmountably opposed. This allows people to put the value 
of being morally principled and committed to a righteous viewpoint over the resolution of a 
problem. It is reasonable to see the outcome of public moral debates such as this one as a 
ritual, in which its accomplishment is not what it appears on the surface, but rather has the 
function of paying homage to some virtue (Philipsen, 1992; Goffman, 1967). In this case, we 
propose that the value of a number of local and higher-order ideals (attaining institutional 
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objects, going about organizational business, coming to agreements in arguments, etc.) are 
sacrificed to display and uphold the moral rightness of each party’s position.  
In grounded practical theory, we ask how the empirical techniques participants deploy 
might be judged as successful or unsuccessful communication strategies. As Craig (2018) 
notes, pluralism is a communication problem, and this event displays exactly how competing 
moralities can emerge in the practice of inclusive ideas. As positive as it seems to come across 
as morally principled, this type of interaction has ambivalent results for interlocutors’ identities 
as well as for the possibility of resolution or compromise. For audiences in agreement, a person 
may come off as admirable; for those in disagreement, they may seem stubborn at best. This 
also shows how, especially for debates such as this that become public and widely shared, 
audiences may also be influenced to differentiate and polarize. It’s worth reflecting on what 
“doing being principled” really gets us in conversation. There are situations where that ritual is 
what’s really going on: this case constituted a performance for an audience in relation to a 
highly visible political issue. But in much of the day-to-day life of organizations--and when we 
decide to actually make headway--perhaps it behooves us to put moving forward ahead of 
bolstering our own rightness, and to value being practical over being principled. Future research 
could explore how account sequences function in similar organizational and public conflicts to 
preclude attempts at common ground among interactants, and what consequences this has for 
audiences, public discourse, and moral problems.   
Sidnell (2016) suggests that “ethical life, to the extent that it is an aspect of our relations 
with others, is realized in and through the moment-to-moment unfolding of social interaction” (p. 
4). People take ethical stances and present selves as ethical persons through their actions 
together; this statement resonates with our tendency to see person’s actions as consistent with 
their identities. In highly public, charged interactions, in which one’s ethics are under scrutiny 
and have wider implications, conflicts can easily take on a ritual character in which upholding a 
moral system and one’s place within it takes precedence over local intersubjective and practical 
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demands. In such situations, we may see the fine interactional workings of how uncompletable 
projects are constructed while participants are seemingly engaged in a desperate battle to get 
something done.  
Notes 
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ComaDQijgxA 
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